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Abstract: This article discusses the abortive efforts of King Nikola of Montenegro to 
achieve territorial expansion for his country during the First World War. Although he 
was a believer in the unification of Serbdom, he wanted to achieve it under his lead-
ership rather than that of the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty, and therefore had no 
intention of letting Montenegro be simply merged with Serbia and his family pushed 
into the background. Therefore, King Nikola campaigned not just for the preservation 
of Montenegro as an independent state, but also for its considerable territorial expan-
sion, mostly at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and also at that of Serbia and Alba-
nia. He did not desist from his endeavours even at the time of his exile following the 
capitulation and occupation of Montenegro in 1916; on the contrary, it was then that 
his demands were most comprehensive. However, he could not resist the reality on 
the ground during and in the wake of the war, and all his efforts remained useless.   
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In the course of his long political activity on the Serbian and Balkan 
scene King Nikola Petrović-Njegoš 
conducted a lot of negotiations, put 
forward and declined many sugges-
tions or proposed solutions and ac-
cepted some compromises. This was 
perfectly natural for a man who auto-
cratically exercised his sovereign duties, 
had no government capable of impos-
ing its will and viewpoint or associates 
who could be entrusted with delicate 
missions. 
Since he was intent on playing 
the leading role in Serbdom and car-
rying out its unification, King Nikola 
found the economic, political and military strengthening of Montenegro 
of utmost importance. During the first phase of his reign, still as Prince, he 
believed that in this way he could secure the influence in political decision-
making for himself and Montenegro. To begin with, he believed that the 
occasional expansion of Montenegro into the neighbouring territories could 
enhance his, and his family’s, reputation and at the same time extinguish or 
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diminish that of other pretenders (the Obrenović and Karadjordjević fami-
lies). For that reason, he incessantly interfered with the surrounding lands 
(Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Metohija, the Adriatic coast) and, in 
some cases, embroiled himself in ill-conceived undertakings which, due to 
the opposition of Great Powers, ended in withdrawal, suspicions and diplo-
matic and political defeats. It is safe to assume that prior to 1914 that motif 
was one of the most important in the shaping of his policy.
The outbreak of the world war as well as its subsequent course con-
vinced King Nikola and a few of his closest associates that such policy was 
not realistic but they did not give up territorial expansion. After all, all other 
countries, the participants in the war, Great Powers and smaller states alike, 
including those in the Balkans, expounded the need for the change of bor-
ders on account of ethnic or strategic considerations. King Nikola resorted 
to all kinds of reasons (economical, strategic, political, the loyalty to the 
Allied cause) to justify his demands. Moreover, as a supreme commander 
of the Montenegrin army he frequently influenced the making of military 
plans which reflected to a large extent his own territorial desiderata — the 
operations in Bay of Cattaro (the Gulf of Kotor), Dalmatia, Herzegovina, 
Bosnia, Northern Albania and Scutari. 
The territorial expansion of Montenegro, in King Nikola’s view, could 
get that country out of the encirclement in which it found itself upon enter-
ing the war and get it rid of the close political and military co-operation 
with Serbia. King Nikola was quick to realise that the most dangerous threat 
to the future of Montenegro and his own family was coming from Serbia 
and her dynasty; he was aware of the prevalent mood of the Montenegrin 
population, the weakness of his state and army and the Allied suspicions of 
him. All this induced him to hurriedly respond and defend his country by 
clamouring for its territorial pretensions. He made effort to do so through 
the mediation of some Great Powers — Italy and Russia.
King Nikola’s first step was to sound Russia out. In early Decem-
ber 1914, the Russian minister at Cetinje, Aleksandar Girs, reported that 
King’s close associates spoke of the necessity for preservation of Montene-
gro’s independence and territorial augmentation to be realised at the end 
of the war. There was some talk of the annexation of Bay of Cattaro and 
the stretch of the coast up to Dubrovnik. Gris found such ambitions to be 
“fantastical”, i.e. unacceptable and badly received among the people.1 As it 
1 Girs to Sazonov, Cetinje, 10 December 1914; Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v epohu 
imperializma, ser. III, I-X (Moscow 1931–1937), vol. VI-2 [hereafter MO], 205–206; 
Dragovan Šepić, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914–1918 (Zagreb 1970), 40, 
106. In November 1914, Petar Plamenac, the foreign minister of Montenegro, discussed 
the incorporation of Scutari. 
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turned out later, that was the minimal programme of Montenegro’s sov-
ereign. His whetted appetites took their final shape when Italy decided to 
enter the war on the side of the Allies in the spring of 1915. Prior to that, 
and as soon as he found out about the Italian decision, King Nikola sent 
to Russia his envoy, General Mitar Martinović, in order to win over the 
Russian court and government for his pretensions. The Martinović mis-
sion formally had another objective — to secure regular supplies of arms 
and food for Montenegro. In fact, the political agenda was more important, 
although Martinović’s efforts remained abortive. The Russian government 
and military circles refused the Montenegrin requests, and Crown Prince 
Danilo complained to the Russian military attaché at Cetinje about the 
support extended to Serbia.2 According to the information provided by the 
Russian minister to Serbia Trubetskoy and his military attaché Potapov, 
Martinović’s mission was extremely important. The former claimed that it 
aimed to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, Grand 
Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich to take into consideration the territorial pre-
tensions of Montenegro and, in particular, to separate them from those of 
Serbia on the occasion of the conclusion of peace. Potapov believed that 
Martinović intended to inform the Grand Duke about the plan hatched 
by the Italian Queen Jelena, the daughter of King Nikola, which envisaged 
the strengthening of Montenegro and the weakening of Serbia. That would 
be realised upon the evacuation of Italian troops through the occupation 
of southern Dalmatia by Montenegrin forces and the territorial expansion 
of Montenegro at Serbia’s expense. Sergei Sazonov, the foreign minister, 
let the Emperor know about this plan and warned that the acceptance of 
the Montenegrin King’s demands would lead to a split between Serbia and 
Montenegro and therefore his requests should be declined.3 The Emperor 
approved of Sazonov’s attitude.
Besides, the Serbian officers attached to the General Staff of the Mon-
tenegrin army notified the Serbian Supreme Command that King Nikola 
had prepared a proclamation to the people of Bosnia, Herzegovina and 
Dalmatia calling them to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Montenegrins 
and Italians. This made Colonel Petar Pešić think that King Nikola had 
2 Dimitrije Vujović, Ujedinjenje Crne Gore i Srbije (Titograd 1962), 106–107; Šepić, 
Italija, 106–107. 
3 Sazonov to Nikolai II, St. Petersburg, 25 April/8 May 1915 [two dates are given ac-
cording to Julian and Gregorian calendar respectively — the former was in official use 
in Montenegro until 1919], MO, III, VII-2, 384–385; Šepić, Italija, 106–107. Serbian 
diplomacy was aware of Montenegro’s territorial pretensions. In early May 1915, King 
Nikola wanted the following territories: Albania up to the Mati river, Herzegovina in 
its old boundaries, Bay of Cattaro up to the Neretva river. King Nikola hoped to push 
out Serbia by introducing Italy in his political game. 
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made to some secret arrangement with the Italians at the expense of Serbia. 
Therefore, he asked Field-Marshall Radomir Putnik, Chief of the Serbian 
Supreme Command, to let him know in which direction the Montenegrin 
troops should be deployed in the impending operations: to Sarajevo, Mo-
star, or Dubrovnik. Pešić insisted that King Nikola should be made clear 
that he had to co-operate in accordance with the agreed plan of the two 
Supreme Commands and forced to “reveal his clandestine negotiations”. A 
week later, General Božidar Janković, Chief of the Montenegrin Supreme 
Command, discussed this matter with King Nikola. The latter read him part 
of the declaration in which he encouraged Bosnians, Herzegovinians and 
Dalmatians not to be desponded and call them to assist the Serbian, Mon-
tenegrin and Italian armies. The proclamation spoke of the mighty Russia, 
the protector of Serbdom and Slavdom, Italy, the bearer of the principle of 
equality of nations, the armies of which would fight along with the Serbian 
and Montenegrin armies. The King presented himself as a bearer of free-
dom and peace and the unifier of Serbdom. General Janković claimed that 
King Nikola impatiently expected Italy’s entry into the war convinced that 
the operations of Italian troops in Dalmatia and Boka would make easier 
the actions of Montenegrin forces in Kotor and Krivošije, the conquest of 
Trebinje and Bileća, and the thrust into Herzegovina and Dalmatia. The 
Chief of the Montenegrin Supreme Command warned that King Nikola 
was in a hurry to make an appearance with his troops in the conquered 
regions due to his vanity and political reasons; he even queried if he could 
send his troops in Bosnia, in the direction of Sarajevo, a suggestion which 
General Janković discouraged. Finally, General Janković suggested that the 
announcement of the proclamation be prevented — he had already been 
working to that end.4
No doubt King Nikola missed no opportunity to achieve his inten-
tions concerning the annexation of new regions to his own country. In do-
ing so, he did not take into account the resistance he met with (Serbia, 
Russia), the uncertainty which Italy’s entry into the war entailed or the 
hostility of the population in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik towards his lib-
eration intentions. Given the all-round opposition he encountered, King 
Nikola’s policy was bound to fail, giving rise in the process to the feeling of 
enmity and distrust towards him which he later would not be able to dis-
pel. The issue of Montenegro’s territorial expansion undoubtedly drew King 
Nikola’s attention during the war and afterwards, and he was supported 
in that endeavour by his governments and ministers. Far from extraordi-
nary, such preoccupation was quite natural. Moreover, King Nikola linked 
4 Janković to Supreme Command, Cetinje, 12 May 1915, conf. no. 955, Vojni arhiv 
[Military Archives], Belgrade, reg. III, b. 91, fasc. 4.
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the territorial expansion of his country with the future of his dynasty and 
the survival of an independent Montenegro. His premise was that Europe’s 
consent to Montenegro’s territorial expansion would in fact mean an ex-
pression of confidence in the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty. At the same time, 
it would considerably contribute to easier acceptance of the return of the 
discredited dynasty on the part of Montenegrin people.5
Just as he was mistaken in counting on Russia, King Nikola was 
under illusion as to Italy’s willingness to support his intentions. From the 
early days of the war Italian diplomacy was determined in its opposition to 
Montenegrin designs in respect of northern Albania, and Scutari in par-
ticular. When King Nikola’s troops entered Scutari in June 1915 Italy sus-
pended any co-operation with Montenegro, requested the blockade of the 
Montenegrin coast and the cancellation of any sort of assistance to that 
country (financial, material).6 The Italian government did not approve of 
King’s other intentions either. As early as March 1915 the Italian foreign 
minister, Sidney Sonnino, informed the Ambassador in London, Marquis 
Guglielmo Imperiali, that Serbia should have Dubrovnik and Medua as 
well as Kotor and Bar “if she one day, which seems highly likely, unifies with 
Montenegro”. A few days later, Sonnino supplemented this telegram add-
ing that Serbia would receive Bosnia, whereas the hinterland — he prob-
ably referred to Herzegovina — would be granted to both Montenegro and 
Serbia which, he was convinced, would soon unify.7 Following the entry of 
Montenegrin troops into Scutari, Sonnino took a much more determined 
stance. He drew the attention of the Italian Ambassadors in the Allied capi-
tals that the coast from Pelješac to the Drim was reserved — he did not say 
for which country — and the Montenegrin demands pertaining to it would 
not be considered before peace terms were discussed.8 Sonnino maintained 
this attitude until the end of the war.
5 Andrija Radović also supported such attitude at the time when he was the prime min-
ister of the government-in-exile. In a memorandum sent to King Nikola on 19 August 
1916 he professed that the territorial expansion of Montenegro was a precondition for 
its restoration, even in case a Yugoslav state came into being. “In the most favourable 
circumstances, Montenegro will encompass Herzegovina up to the Neretva river, and 
with Dubrovnik, Bay of Cattaro and Skadar [Shkodra] there will be a state with about a 
million inhabitants”. V. G. Popovitch, Censuré ou M. André Radovitch (Paris 1917), 77. 
6 S. Ratković, “Sukob Italije i Crne Gore oko Skadra 1915. godine”, Istorijski zapisi 
XXXI/1-2 (1974), 95, 122. 
7 Sonnino to Imperiali, Rome, 14 March 1915, Gab. Speciale, no. 101; Sonnino to 
Imperiali, Carloti and Tittoni, Rome, 21 March 1915, Gab. Speciale, no. 125, Sidney 
Sonnino Papers on microfilm, reel 31.
8 Sonnino to Ambassadors, Rome, 13 August 1915, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani 
[hereafter DDI], ser. V, vol. IV, 360. 
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In order to demonstrate his intention not to give up territorial ex-
pansion, King Nikola approved the execution of a long-prepared incursion 
into northern Albania and the capture of Scutari. At the end of June 1915 
Montenegrin troops under the command of General Vešović entered Scu-
tari despite numerous admonitions of the Allied governments. This action 
brought about further troubles and difficulties for the already discredited 
and isolated King Nikola. At the initiative of Italian diplomacy, the Allied 
governments handed a note to Cetinje on 10 July expressing their disagree-
ment with the occupation of Scutari, refusing to recognise it and welcom-
ing the decision of the Montenegrin government to comply with the final 
solution of Great Powers after the war. In the following months, there were 
rumours to the effect that the Montenegrin action had been taken in col-
lusion with Austria-Hungary.9 King Nikola was willing to agree to Great 
Powers arbitration because he believed it to be a way of keeping the issue of 
Montenegro’s territorial expansion on the agenda in future.
In early 1916, having found themselves in exile in Italy following the 
capitulation of Montenegro, King Nikola and Lazar Mijušković, the prime 
minister, continued their work with a view to securing territorial conces-
sions after the war. That was indeed a rather unusual situation: having dis-
banded his army, consented to capitulation and left the country, the King 
requested the Allies to support Montenegrin territorial demands. The scene 
was almost grotesque and demonstrated the extent to which King Nikola 
did not grasp the situation he found himself in and how much he alien-
ated the Allied governments with his actions. Naturally, he first turned to 
the Russian government for support. This was another mistake as Russian 
diplomacy did not approve of the Montenegrin court’s policy and it increas-
ingly left it to other Great Powers to deal with it. In mid-March 1916, King 
Nikola expressed his concerns for the future of Montenegro to the Russian 
minister at his court. He laid down the following conditions for its survival 
as an independent state: a) assurance of its independence; and b) the neces-
sity of its territorial expansion. The Russian minister replied that the matter 
could not be discussed at the moment and that King Nikola should work 
towards rapprochement and co-operation with Serbia.10
On the same day (19 March), Mijušković prepared a memorandum, 
at the express request of King Nikola, which he handed to the Russian 
minister Islavin. This document detailed all the territorial demands of the 
Montenegrin sovereign and pointed out that the guarantee of territorial 
and political integrity of Montenegro on the part of Great Powers was a 
precondition for the preservation of its independence.
9 Ratković, “Sukob Italije i Crne Gore”, 114–116. 
10 Vujović, Ujedinjenje, 157.
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As for territorial extension, King’s maximal demands were as follows: 
the border would run ten kilometres south of the mouth of the Drim into 
the Adriatic Sea, along the watershed of the left bank of the Drim up to 
the confluence of the Black and the White Drim where the border between 
Serbia and Montenegro would be rectified in favour of the latter country in 
the Prijepolje region; from there it would run along the Lim and the Drina 
northwards to Rogatica and then to the west so as to attach Rogatica, Sara-
jevo and the surrounding area  to Montenegro; the border would then run 
below Livno and descend to the sea, leaving the entire course and mouth of 
the Neretva to Montenegro. The entire bank of the the Neretva up to the 
Medua Bay would belong to Montenegro.11
King Nikola’s demands were unrealistic and unacceptable to any 
Great Power, or Serbia. Italy, in particular, refused to discuss the coastal 
region and Montenegrin territorial demands in general. Serbia and Rus-
sia followed suit. It was no wonder then that the Allies did not respond to 
the Montenegrin memorandum, which made King Nikola and Mijušković 
anxious. Their fear forced them into further mistakes.
Since the Russians were not forthcoming, King Nikola turned to the 
Italians. At the end of August 1916, he paid a visit to the Italian ambas-
sador in Paris, Tomasso Tittoni. In the course of their second conversation 
he told the ambassador about his intention to visit the Italian royal couple 
in the Racconigi castle. He assured Tittoni he had not conducted negotia-
tions with the Serbian government even though there was much talk to that 
effect, and also professed that he would leave to Great Powers to decide on 
territorial acquisitions of Montenegro and Serbia and, once such decisions 
were translated into a written document, he would work towards its fulfil-
ment. “He handed me a memorandum in which he proclaimed his aspira-
tions,” Tittoni wrote to Rome, adding that he would send it by courier. The 
memorandum has not been found and its content is not known although 
it is safe to assume that it was similar, if not identical, to the text given to 
Islavin. Finally, Nikola gave assurances to Tittoni that Italy had her own 
reasons to work towards the restoration of Montenegro and asked him to 
relay their conversation to Sonnino. King Nikola also mentioned that “his 
General has raised a rebellion against Austria-Hungary, liberated certain 
counties and captured some arms”. The King intended to return to Mon-
tenegro and his people and to fight along with them — he believed that 
Italy should help the rebels.12 He considered Italy the only possible ally on 
11 Ibid. 158.
12 Tittoni to Sonnino, Paris, 30 August 1916, Gab. 180, Sonnino Papers, reel 11. 
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account of her policy towards Yugoslav unification. However, he could not 
count much on Italian support either then or later.13
For quite some time King Nikola did not broach the territorial is-
sue or send memoranda to Allied ministers and ambassadors. It was not 
before September 1917 that he prepared a new and lengthy memorandum 
for the Allied governments in which he laid out Montenegro’s territorial 
pretensions. The reason behind this renewed activity was obvious: in July 
1917 the Corfu conference between the Serbian government and the Yu-
goslav exiled politicians from Austria-Hungary took place and accepted the 
programme of Yugoslav unification; prior to that, in the spring of 1917, 
the Montenegrin Committee for National Unification had been formed 
which soon developed a lively activity against King Nikola and his policy. 
That was a sign for alarm and a stimulus to address other Great Powers 
as well. On 27 September 1917, King Nikola handed to George Graham, 
British Chargé d’Affairs at the Montenegrin court, a lengthy memoran-
dum presenting his requests and expectations. He told Graham that he had 
drawn up the memorandum himself, of which he was very proud, and asked 
him to forward it to London. In an extensive document written in French 
the King presented the history of his country and Serbian people from the 
times of the Ottoman Sultan Murad I, the struggle against the invader and 
the sacrifices endured by Montenegro; he wrote of a high sense of duty 
possessed of Montenegrins, their devotion to progress and civilisation, and 
he remarked that Cetinje had had a printing press before Rome, and after 
London got one, in which books were printed both in Cyrillic and Latin 
letters. “A democrat in heart, the Montenegrin loves the fatherly authority 
of the old and famous [Petrović-Njegoš] dynasty which steers his destiny 
even today,” the King wrote. Then he looked back at Napoleon I’s wars, 
the conquest of his armies in Bay of Cattaro which had led to the separa-
tion “between the hard-working peasant and the seaman who cannot resign 
himself to being separated from a Montenegrin”. He reminded that Mon-
tenegro had not received in the Balkan Wars what was due to it — Scutari, 
although it had lost 6,000 men in the fighting for that town. He ascribed 
the responsibility for that to Austria-Hungary. Then he referred to the as-
sistance provided by Montenegro to the Allied countries during the war; he 
also reminded of the fact that the Allies had not provided the expected help 
to the Montenegrin army and people, which resulted in immense casualties, 
devastation and suffering.
13 In March 1917, when the need for an Italian protectorate in Albania was considered, 
Sonnino agreed “to make some concessions in the Shkodra region” to Montenegro. 
Sonnino to Morone, Rome, 18 March 1917, DDI, ser. V, vol. VII, 385–386.
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All this was but a prelude in what King Nikola wanted to request. 
He raised the question if such casualties were not deserving of the Allied 
favour and support, in particular territorial compensations and reparations. 
In order to heal its wounds, economically recover and secure its future, King 
Nikola stressed, Montenegro had to rectify its borders. At the expense of 
Albania he demanded Scutari and Medua, important on account of trade 
and supply lines; in the north, he asked for part of Bosnia, up to Mt Ro-
manija, for which Montenegrins shed their blood in the war; Herzegovina 
with Mostar, a region linked since ancient times with Montenegro through 
the common struggle against the Turks; the Neretva was envisaged as the 
northwest border of Montenegro which would encompass Dubrovnik, a 
splendid cultural centre; the entire coast from the mouth of the Neretva to 
that of the Drim, Bay of Cattaro included, should also belong to Monte-
negro; in the east, in the direction of Serbia, Montenegro had no territorial 
pretensions since “a people of the same blood and language connected to us 
with brotherly love” lived there. Finally, King Nikola pointed out that the 
Montenegrins counted on the Allied wisdom and generosity to the smallest 
ally and expressed his conviction that such an attitude would secure peace 
in the Balkans.14
King Nikola’s programme was very precise and more ambitious that 
the previous ones. In comparison with the earlier documents and his state-
ments, there was a change in the thrust and nature of arguments. Above 
all, humanitarian and civilisational reasons were underlined rather than po-
litical — the sacrifices for the Allied cause, economic restoration, progress, 
better future. There was a considerable difference in relation to the previous 
memoranda in respect of the size of the territory and regions requested 
by King Nikola. The memorandum of March 1916 was abandoned. For 
example, that memorandum called for rectification of the Serbian border, 
whereas the latest one did not raise that question. As far as the coast was 
concerned, the pretensions remained as before with a minor adjustment — 
the border proposed in 1916 had been moved ten kilometres south of the 
mouth of the Drim; also, the requests concerning Herzegovina took their 
final shape. On the whole, King’s memorandum presented his maximal ter-
ritorial demands.
That was how King’s programme was understood in the British 
Foreign Office. Harold Nicolson of the Political Department thought the 
memorandum had completely formulated Montenegrin territorial preten-
sions, but believed these should be neither discussed nor decided upon. He 
14 Graham to Balfour, Paris, 27 September 1917, no. 10, with the attached Memoran-
dum of King Nikola, no date, Foreign Office Records 371, file 189486–189486, The 
National Archives, London [hereafter FO 371].
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suggested that King Nikola simply be told that his requests would be con-
sidered. George Clerk, a Political Department official, noted that the King’s 
demands, if accepted, would mean the doubling of Montenegro’s size. “They 
are, of course, completely unacceptable, mostly because of the existing vari-
ous treaties and commitments.” He pointed out that the memorandum was 
“typical of its royal author” and that he should be simply thanked. Anything 
else, even an assurance that his requests would be taken into consideration, 
had better be avoided. His suggestion was accepted and on 8 October Gra-
ham was instructed to thank King Nikola for his document, which he did.
A few weeks later the same memorandum was handed to the Ital-
ian ambassador in Paris, Marquis Salvago-Ragi. Salvago-Ragi reported to 
Sonnino that King Nikola had given him a memorandum prepared for the 
peace conference which had been nicely received in London, and asked 
permission to forward the memorandum to Rome.15 That was the end of 
this matter: King Nikola never received any assurance or promise regarding 
a favourable consideration of his demands.
In early 1918, certain important events took place forcing King 
Nikola to voice his views. The October Revolution, the Italian defeat at the 
Battle of Kobarid and the subsequent US declaration of war upon Austria-
Hungary had considerable impact on the Balkan developments, Montene-
gro included. To encourage Italian resistance, on one hand, and convince 
Austria-Hungary’s ruling circles that their country could be saved through 
deflection from Germany, on the other, British prime minister, David Lloyd 
George, and American president, Woodrow Wilson, gave speeches together. 
Both of them expounded their conviction that Austria-Hungary should be 
preserved, whereas Serbia and Montenegro should be restored and indem-
nified. That meant that neither country could expect territorial enlargement. 
As Montenegro was supposed to be granted nearly all territories at the 
expense of Austria-Hungary, the suggestions of the Allied leaders denoted 
their disagreement with the King’s demands. Moreover, although it did not 
say it publically, the British War Cabinet made a decision that the best so-
lution of the Montenegrin question would the annexation of Montenegro 
to Serbia.16
During these days King Nikola was at his residence in Pau, in the 
south of France. His prime minister, Evgenije Popović, visited him there 
15 Salvago-Ragi to Sonnino, Paris, 17 October 1917, DDI, ser. V, vol. IX, 167–168. 
Sonnino replied that the minister Romano Avezzana should thank King Nikola for 
his memorandum which he had read with “interest”. Sonnino to Avezzana, Rome, 18 
October 1917, Gab. 1699/14, Sonnino Papers, reel 41. 
16 Dragoljub Živojinović, “Velika Britanija i problem Crne Gore 1914–1918. Godine”, 
Balcanica VIII (1977), 513.  
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and they discussed the Allied leaders’ programmes. According to the Italian 
minister Avezzana, the King was “very satisfied with the recent speeches 
of the English prime minister and president Wilson which included the 
restoration of Montenegro among the chief war aims”. King Nikola was 
worried because of France, the statesmen of which failed to mention Mon-
tenegro and its future in their public statements. He considered that failure 
deliberate, in fact evidence that France was still working to suffocate Mon-
tenegro and attach it to Serbia.17 A month later, in February 1918, King 
Nikola met in Paris with the Italian prime minister, Vittorio Orlando, and 
foreign minister Sonnino. They assured him that the Italian government 
would make every effort to restore Montenegro after the war. The King also 
tried to secure France’s support and, to that end, visited the prime minister, 
Georges Clemenceau. He complained to Clemenceau about the manner in 
which he, his family and government had been treated; he objected to his 
being depicted as a traitor and treated as an enemy, to the cancellation of 
his subvention, to the prevention of a Montenegrin regiment from being 
formed, and to suggesting the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia. Ac-
cording to the King, Clemenceau was very friendly towards him personally 
and to Montenegro, and he was willing to renew the subvention and sup-
port the formation of a Montenegrin regiment. He also stated to have been 
unfamiliar with the plans for the annexation of Montenegro to Serbia, but 
he promised to make enquires about that matter.18
After all these conversations the situation was much clearer and the 
attitude of Allies towards Montenegro was determined. Great Britain, the 
USA and Italy were inclined to the preservation of Montenegro as an inde-
pendent state while France’s stance was indefinite. No Great Power, how-
ever, expressed its views on the territorial demands and expectations of the 
Montenegrin sovereign. He could have been satisfied with such assurances 
even though some of them were insincere (Britain and France) while others 
were motivated by own interests (Italy). King Nikola realised what was the 
value of such assurances as well as the meaning of the complete silence in 
respect of his territorial requests. That seemed ominous to him. He confided 
his thoughts and mood to Avezzana in mid-April 1918. The Italian minis-
ter found him “worried and reserved”, which he put down to the uncertain 
situation and the hesitation of Allies to voice their views on Montenegro’s 
future. On that occasion, the King told Avezzana that he decided to pay a 
visit to Queen Jelena and discuss his future actions with her. The minister 
17 Avezzana to Sonnino, Paris, 12 January 1918, Gab. 23/16, Montenegro 1915–1918, 
box 158, The Archives of Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Rome. 
18 Avezzana to Sonnino, Paris, 7 February 1918, Gab. 23/16, ibid. 
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refrained from giving any advice to the King, but he was convinced that 
there were serious reasons for the impending visit.19
Serbian diplomacy was also aware of this visit. The minister in Lon-
don, Jovan Jovanović, wrote to Regent Alexander that King Nikola was 
in Rome. He assured the Regent that Italy would side with Montenegro 
against the unification and assist King Nikola to form a Montenegrin regi-
ment which would be sent to Albania to be as close as possible to Monte-
negro. Jovanović did not see a fortunate future for the old King for whom 
he claimed to have come into conflict with his own people. The minister 
believed that Montenegro’s fate had been decided a long time ago. “Since 
1904 the old skilful King has lost the rudder of his ship which he ‘skil-
fully’ steered from 1860 onwards,” he wrote. “Since then his ship has drifted 
without a rudder, without a mast. It has not been entirely wracked as yet, 
but the end is near…”20 Jovanović’s metaphoric prophecy eventually proved 
accurate.
At the beginning of May 1918, the King received and visited the 
Allied ambassadors. On 5 May, he had a conversation with the American 
ambassador, Thomas Page, and expressed the appreciation of Montenegrin 
people for president Wilson and his ideas; he hoped that the USA would 
protect the rights of small nations, Montenegro included. Finally, he de-
livered a lengthy memorandum on the territorial demands of Montenegro 
and requested that it be forwarded to president Wilson.21 Two days later, 
on 8 May, the British ambassador, Rennell Rodd, visited King Nikola at 
his residence. Their conversation was much more open than that with Page. 
The King complained about his unfortunate fate, uncertain future, Serbia’s 
attitude; he tried to convince Rodd that the Montenegrins did not want 
unification with Serbia, that France was under Serbia’s influence and that 
he therefore trusted in Great Britain alone. He handed him a memorandum 
for which he claimed to have been prepared for the peace conference, he 
requested that it remain confidential and be forwarded to the Foreign Of-
19 Avezzana to Sonnino, Pau, 17 and 23 April 1918, Gab. 20, 22, Sonnino Papers, reel 
19. Nikola journeyed with his daughter Vjera. 
20 Jovanović to Regent Alexander, London, 27 April 1918, private, Court’s office, vari-
ous years, Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Belgrade. 
21 Page to Lansing, Rome, 6 May 1918, State Department Records, series 763, 
72119/1644, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington. 
The memorandum was immediately forwarded to President Wilson. In his conversa-
tion with Page, King Nikola spoke of other matters as well — relations with the Italian 
royal family, the hopes in the USA, the French attitude, the appointment of a minister 
in Washington. Page to Lansing, 7 May 1918, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States. The Lansing Papers 1914–1918, I–II (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1939–1940), vol. II, 122–124. 
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fice.22 A few days later, on 12 May, the King handed a memorandum to the 
Italian minister at the Montenegrin court, Marquis Paolo Montagliari.
Describing the content of the memorandum, ambassador Rodd 
pointed out that King Nikola was “a master of that kind of documents”. 
His demands were identical to those he had made in September. Indeed, 
the only new feature concerned a few paragraphs which depicted the wars 
waged by Montenegrins in Herzegovina (1876) and the sufferings endured 
by Montenegro at the time of Ottoman incursions (1852 and 1862). This 
suggests that King Nikola did not give up his demands, but he refrained 
from making new ones. He remained convinced that the territorial exten-
sions he envisaged were a sine qua non of Montenegro’s future.
The reaction of American and Italian diplomacy is not known. The 
Foreign Office received the King’s memorandum with resignation rather 
than outright rejection. Nicolson noted that the King had mentioned the 
struggle for Scutari in order to use it in his own defence. As for Dubrovnik, 
Nicolson opined that this town had to belong to Serbia, even if Montenegro 
was restored. His resignation was apparent in a remark that “the question 
of Montenegro would be one of the most difficult for the peace confer-
ence, because little can be done without a plebiscite which would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to carry out”. Allen Leeper, an expert for territorial 
settlement, was hopeful that the recently held conference of the oppressed 
nationalities of Austria-Hungary and the Italo-Yugoslav agreement (Torre-
Trumbić) would diminish the influence of King Nikola in Rome. His words 
confirmed the widely-spread belief that Italy was a sole protector of Mon-
tenegro and its ruler — and thus the main factor in the solution of this 
question.
In the following months there was no indication of King Nikola’s 
new initiatives with regard to Montenegro’s territorial demands. His at-
tention was increasingly drawn to the question of the unification of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. He considered it essential for the future of his dynasty. 
Realising that he was not able to prevent the unification as the Allied gov-
ernments supported it, the King endeavoured to discredit the foundations 
(centralism) on which it was supposed to be executed. He condemned Dr. 
Ante Trumbić, the president of the Yugoslav committee, for his co-opera-
tion with the Serbian government and claimed that he had no support in 
22 Rodd to Balfour, Rome, 9 May 1918, conf. 63 with the attached undated memoran-
dum in French, FO 371, file 85253/85253, TNA. The text of the memorandum can also 
be found in Montenegro 1915–1918, box 158, Archives of Italian Foreign Ministry, 
Rome. 
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the country and spoke for no one. He advocated the creation of a federal 
state in which all constituent provinces would have autonomous status.23
When the peace conference invited the delegation of Montenegro 
in early March 1919 to put forward and explain its requests, the prime 
minister, Jovan Plamenac, revised the objectives formulated in the King’s 
memoranda. Nevertheless, their essence remained the same even if their 
justification was considerably different from that advanced by King Nikola. 
Plamenac requested Herzegovina, Bay of Cattaro and Scutari with the sur-
rounding area. His memorandum did not mention Medua, Dubrovnik, the 
Neretva valley, the Adriatic coast from the mouth of the Neretva to that of 
the Drim or the Serbian border.24 Apparently, this was a departure from the 
King’s maximal demands, and it provided the Montenegrin delegation with 
room for manoeuvre to expand or reduce its requests depending on the situ-
ation. It remains a mystery why King Nikola agreed to such curbing of his 
agenda. He must have accepted it at the request of Plamenac.
King Nikola gradually formulated the territorial demands of Mon-
tenegro. Initially, these were constrained and indefinite, often unclear and 
contradictory. Some regions and towns were always included in his com-
binations: Bay of Cattaro and Kotor, Skadar, Dubrovnik. Mostar, Sarajevo 
and Medua were added later. At first, the request for rectification of the 
Serbian border was advanced and later that claim was abandoned.
It should be noted that King Nikola put forward his maximal de-
mands at the least favourable moment for him and Montenegro, i.e. while 
he was in exile. No doubt he misjudged his abilities and influence as well 
as the Allies’ frame of mind. He realised it was worth addressing some gov-
ernments (Italian and British) and not others (French). He quickly came 
to the conclusion that Russian support could not be expected, whereas he 
placed great hopes in the USA and its president. Given the small number of 
his capable officials, it is difficult to ascertain if he conferred with someone 
and, if he did, with whom. He obviously wrote his memoranda himself, as 
evidenced by their flamboyant style and phrases, historical references and 
emphasis on war.
He presented himself as an enlightened, progressive ruler who was 
hampered in his efforts to forge a better future for Montenegro by its pov-
erty, backwardness, small size and the small number of his subjects. These 
23 Montagliari to Sonnino, Paris, 31 August and 3 September 1918, no. 5–6, Montene-
gro 1915–1918, box 158, ibid. 
24 Montenegro before Peace Conference, Memorandum of 5 March 1919 which the 
government of the Kingdom of Montenegro submitted to the Paris Conference (Paris 
1919), 27–37; Dragoljub Živojinović, “Pitanje Crne Gore i mirovna konferencija 1919. 
godine”, Istorija XX veka XIV-XV (1982), 42–43. 
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were the arguments he used in order to support his demands which seemed, 
and with good reason, excessive and unrealistic to most people. Moreover, 
his requests were impossible to achieve also on account of the fact that 
Great Powers took a dim view of his return to Montenegro.
Being an experienced statesman, King Nikola believed that the fate of 
Montenegro and his dynasty was in his own hands. He was the only person 
who could speak on behalf of both with the requisite authority. However, 
the Allied diplomats and statesmen found him a cunning, shifty, insincere 
autocrat and distrusted him. He lost their confidence through his actions 
and policy for which he was suspected of collaboration with Austria-Hun-
gary and the betrayal of the Allies. This was his stigma and he could not 
shake it off until the end of the war.
Despite the King’s great hopes, his efforts to win over the Allies for 
his programme of territorial expansion failed dismally. That was inevitable 
and the King could hardly be responsible on this score. He spared no ef-
fort, but the circumstances and resistance to his policy were such as to make 
it impossible to any person to achieve more than he did. He persistently 
struggled for what he believed in and realised in the end that the struggle 
was useless.
UDC 929.731Nikola I Petrović
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